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We discuss a quantum network, in which the sender hasm0 outgoing channels, the receiver hasm0
incoming channels, each channel is of capacity d, each intermediate node applies invertible unitary,
only m1 channels are corrupted, and other non-corrupted channels are noiseless. As our result, we
show that the quantum capacity is not smaller than (m0 − 2m1 + 1) log d under the following two
settings. In the first case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are arbitrary and the corruptions
on the m1 channels are individual. In the second case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are
restricted to Clifford operations and the corruptions on the m1 channels are adaptive, i.e., the
attacker is allowed to have a quantum memory. Further, our code in the second case realizes the
noiseless communication even with the single-shot setting and is constructed dependently only on
the network topology and the places of the m1 corrupted channels while this result holds regardless
of the network topology and the places.
I. INTRODUCTION
When two distant players communicate their quantum
states via a single channel, their communication can be
disturbed by the corruption of the channel. In the classi-
cal information theory, to resolve this problem, they em-
ploy information transmission over a network, which is
composed of nodes and channels [1–3]. Combining a net-
work code, they realized a reliable communication even
when a part of nodes are corrupted because a network
code realizes the diversification of risk. Many existing
papers for the quantum network addressed the multiple-
unicast network [4–13]. The coding scheme proposed in
[5] was already implemented experimentally [14]. How-
ever, they did not discuss a reliable quantum network
code over corruptions on the quantum network even in
the unicast network. Since a corruption on a node can
be propagated to the entire network due to the network
structure, it is desired to discuss a reliable quantum net-
work code for the unicast network even in the presence
of the corruption. Indeed, while the preceding paper [15]
constructed such a network code, it did not discuss the
optimality of the transmission rate. Also, the code con-
structed in [15] works only when the unitary operations
on the network nodes belong to a limited class.
This paper discusses the quantum capacity of a par-
tially corrupted quantum unicast network, i.e., the op-
timal value of the reliable transmission rate under the
knowledge of the form of the corruption for a more gen-
eral class of node operations on the network. Our prob-
lem setting is slightly different from those of the preced-
ing papers [13, 15] because [13, 15] discussed quantum
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network coding under limited knowledge of the corrup-
tion. Whereas conventional network coding considers the
optimization of node operations given a directed graph
of the network, we consider the quantum capacity when
node operations are given as well because it is often quite
difficult to control node operations. Specifically, we ad-
dress the worst-case capacity among a certain condition,
which is formulated as follows.
Every quantum channel transmits a d-dimensional sys-
tem by one use of the network. The sender hasm0 outgo-
ing quantum channels. Each intermediate node has the
same number of incoming quantum channels and outgo-
ing quantum channels. The node applies a fixed unitary
across the incoming quantum systems and outputs them
to the outgoing quantum channels. Finally, the receiver
receives m0 quantum systems via m0 incoming quantum
channels. We assume that only m1 quantum channels
are corrupted at most. Other channels are assumed to
be noiseless in the same way as secure classical network
coding [1–3] because the errors of these normal chan-
nels can be corrected by quantum error correcting code.
Also, the network is assumed to have no cycle and to be
well synchronized, i.e., to have no delayed transmission.
Only the sender and the receiver are allowed to optimize
their coding operation due to the difficulty of node op-
eration control. Although the paper [15] assumed that
the sender and the receiver do not know the places of
corrupted channels, the places are assumed to be known
to them in our setting.
There are two types of quantum settings. The first
one is the individual corruption, in which the corruption
on each corrupted quantum channel is done individually.
The other is the adaptive corruption, in which the corrup-
tions on respective corrupted quantum channels are done
adaptively. That is, the attacker has a quantum mem-
ory, and the quantum memory interacts the corrupted
quantum channel on each corruption. For an adversar-
2ial corruption, we need to consider such a malicious case.
This kind of corruption can be written by quantum comb
[16, 17]. The adaptive setting is more general than the
individual setting, and the adaptive setting often cannot
be reduced to the individual setting in general. For exam-
ple, adaptive strategies cannot be reduced to individual
strategies quantum channel discrimination [18].
In the classical case of this setting, we can show that
the capacity, i.e., the maximum transmission rate is not
smaller than (m0−m1) log d. In contrast, when our quan-
tum channel has only individual corruptions, we find
that the quantum capacity, i.e., the maximum trans-
mission rate of the quantum state is not smaller than
(m0 − 2m1 + 1) log d. This fact is shown by the analysis
of coherent information on the quantum network. Fur-
ther, when the unitaries on our network are limited to
Clifford operations, the quantum capacity is not smaller
than (m0− 2m1+1) log d even when the corruptions are
adaptive. In this case, our code can be constructed in
the single-shot setting by using Clifford operations. This
construction depends only on the applied Clifford oper-
ations and the places of the corrupted channels, and is
independent of Eve’s operation to the corrupted chan-
nels. This phenomena can be intuitively explained for
the case of Clifford operations as follows. The sender can
identify the place of the first corruption. However, at
the other corruptions, the corrupted computation bases
and the corrupted Fourier bases split in general. For this
characterization, the behavior of the error is described
by the the symplectic structure. In particular, the sym-
plectic diagonalization plays an essential role in the code
construction. Hence, in the worst case, totally 2m1 − 1
quantum systems are corrupted.
II. CLASSICAL NETWORK MODEL
When all the node operations are invertible linear on
a finite field of order q (= d), the receiver can find a
linear subspace for corrupted information, as discussed
in [2]. The dimension of the subspace is bounded by m1.
Hence, the capacity is not smaller than (m0 −m1) log d.
However, when node operations are not necessarily linear
but are invertible, we cannot apply the above discussion.
Even in this case, we can show that the capacity is not
smaller than (m0 −m1) log d as shown in Appendix A.
III. GENERAL UNITARY NETWORK MODEL
The general unitary network model is described as fol-
lows. In this model, we assume that the places of the
channels to be corrupted are known. Since our network is
composed of unitary operations and partial corruptions,
our network model of the adaptive corruption is given
as the general form with Fig. 1, whose reason is illus-
trated in Fig. 2. The input and output systems are the
m0-tensor product systemH⊗m0 of the same systemH of
Sender Receiver
0U⋮ ⋮ ⋮⋮1U 1mU1 1mU −
Eve’s memory
1Uɶ 1mU
ɶ
FIG. 1: Unitary network with adaptive corruption.
After the application of the unitary Ui−1, the unitary
U˜i is applied.
v0
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U˜1
(a) Quantum network with three intermediate nodes. Sender and
receiver have m0 = 6 outgoing and incoming channels, respectively,
and each intermediate node has the same number of incoming and
outgoing channels. The zigzagged lines are corrupted channels and
two channels are corrupted (i.e., m1 = 2).
(b) The network in (a) in the form of Fig. 1.
FIG. 2: Reorganization of the network in the form of
Fig. 1.
dimension d, and m1+1 unitaries U = (U0, U1, . . . , Um1)
are applied between the input and output systems, which
has m1 intervals. Eve can access only the first system on
each interval, and has her memory so that the corruption
in the i-th interval is given as the unitary U˜i between her
memory and the corrupted system, i.e., the first system
on the i-th interval.
Our first result is on the minimum capacity of the gen-
eral unitary network with individual corruption, in which
3Sender Receiver
0U⋮ ⋮ ⋮⋮1U 1mU1 1mU −
1Γ 1mΓ
FIG. 3: Unitary network with individual corruption.
After the application of the unitary Ui−1, the noisy
operation Γi is applied.
Eve is assumed to have no memory. Hence, her opera-
tion on the i-th interval can be written as TP-CP maps
Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γm1) as Fig. 3. In this case, the chan-
nel between the input and output systems is denoted
by Λ(U ,Γ). C(Λ) expresses the quantum capacity of
a quantum channel Λ. One of our main results charac-
terizes the quantum capacity under the individual cor-
ruption as follows.
Theorem 1. The minimum quantum capacity is given
as follows.
minC(Λ(U ,Γ)) = (m0 − 2m1 + 1) log d. (1)
Here, the minimum is taken over all channels Λ(U ,Γ)
under the individual corruption.
To show the theorem, we employ the coherent informa-
tion Ic(ρ,Λ) for an input state ρ and a quantum channel
Λ with an output system A. By using the environment
E of Λ, the coherent information Ic(ρ,Λ) is written as
H(A)−H(E), where H(A) and H(E) are the von Neu-
mann entropy of the respective system when the input
state is ρ [19][20, (8.37)]. It is known that the quantum
capacity C(Λ) is given as the maximum
lim
n→∞
max
ρ
1
n
Ic(ρ,Λ
⊗n), (2)
where the maximum is taken over all the input densities
on the n-tensor system of the input system of Λ [21–24],
[20, Theorem 9.10].
Lemma 1. A individual corruption Λ(U ,Γ) satisfies
max
ρ
Ic(ρ,Λ(U ,Γ)) ≥ (m0 − 2m1 + 1) log d. (3)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix B. Due
to the additivity property Ic(ρ
⊗n,Λ⊗n) = nIc(ρ,Λ), the
lemma and the above capacity formula (2) guarantee the
inequality ≥ in (1). As shown later, Theorem 2 guar-
antees the existence of a channel Λ(U ,Γ) to satisfy the
equality, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. CLIFFORD NETWORK MODEL
To extend Theorem 1 to the adaptive corruption de-
scribed in Fig. 1, we introduce Clifford network model.
In this model, our code can achieve the capacity even
with the single-shot setting. For this aim, we prepare
several notations. Given a prime power q = pdq , our
Hilbert space H is assumed to be spanned by the com-
putational basis {|x〉}x∈Fq , where Fq is the algebraic ex-
tension of the finite field Fp with degree dq. That is,
the dimension of the Hilbert space H is assumed to be
q. Then, for s, t ∈ Fq, we define the generalized Pauli
operators X(s) and Z(t) as X(s) :=
∑
x∈Fq |x + s〉〈x|
and Z(t) :=
∑
x∈Fq ω
trxt|x〉〈x|, where ω := e2pi
√−1/p.
Here, for an element z ∈ Fq, tr z expresses the element
TrMz ∈ Fp, whereMz denotes the matrix representation
of the multiplication map x 7→ zx with identifying the fi-
nite field Fq with the vector space F
dq
p . We define the
Fourier basis {|y〉F ∈ H}y∈Fq of the computational basis
{|x〉}x∈Fq ∈ H as
|y〉F :=
∑
x∈Fq
1√
q
ωtrxy|x〉.
To consider our network model, for vectors s =
(s1, . . . , sn), t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Fnq , we define the oper-
ators X(s) and Z(t) on the n-fold tensor product system
H⊗n as X(s) := X(s1)⊗ · · · ⊗X(sn) and Z(t) := Z(t1)⊗
· · · ⊗ Z(tn). Then, the discrete Weyl operator is defined
as W(s, t) := X(s)Z(t). Then, for (s, t), (s′, t′) ∈ F2nq ,
we define the skew symmetric matrix J on F2nq and the
inner product 〈(s, t), (s′, t′)〉 ∈ Fp as J =
(
0 −I
I 0
)
with
〈(s, t), (s′, t′)〉 :=∑i=1 tr(sis′i+ tit′i). Then, the commu-
tation relation
W(s, t)W(s′, t′) = ω〈(s,t),J(s
′,t′)〉W(s′, t′)W(s, t) (4)
holds, and a square matrix g on F2nq is called a symplec-
tic matrix when 〈(s, t), J(s′, t′)〉 = 〈g(s, t), Jg(s′, t′)〉 for
(s, t), (s′, t′) ∈ F2nq .
Next, we introduce Clifford group as a subset of the
set U(H⊗n) of unitaries on H⊗n. Using the set W :=
{cW(s, t)}|c|=1,(s,t)∈F2nq , we define the Clifford group C
as C := {U ∈ U(H⊗n)|UWU−1 = W}. An element of C
is called a Clifford unitary.
For any element U ∈ C, there exists a symplectic ma-
trix g such that
UW(s, t)U−1 = cW(g(s, t)) (5)
for (s, t) ∈ F2nq with a complex number c satisfying |c| =
1. Conversely, for any symplectic matrix g, there exists a
unitary U to satisfy (5). A typical construction of such a
unitary U is given in [20, Section 8.3]. This construction
is called metaplectic representation and is denoted by
U(g) in this paper.
Now, the input and output systems are assumed to be
H⊗m0 , and the unitary Ui is to be an element of Clifford
group. Such a network is called Clifford network. We
choose a symplectic matrix gi as U(gi) = Ui.
4Theorem 2. For Clifford network, the minimum quan-
tum capacity is (m0 − 2m1 +1) log q in the adaptive cor-
ruption, i.e., the case when Eve has a memory to perform
adaptive attacks.
To show Theorem 2, we describe the behaviors of the
errors in the terms of the symplectic structure. That
is, the errors can be described by vectors in F2m0q . For
this aim, we introduce notations and parameters of the
network as follows. Let ei be the vector in F
2m0
q that
has only one nonzero element 1 in the i-th entry. Using
e1 and em0+1, we define 2m1 vectors v1, . . . , v2m1 ∈ F2m0q
as vi := g
−1
0 · · · g−1i−1e1 and vm1+i := g−10 · · · g−1i−1em0+1 for
i = 1, . . . ,m1. Since e1 and em0+1 describe the directions
of errors in the respective interval, all the directions in
the linear space V spanned by v1, . . . , v2m1 are corrupted
in this whole network. However, since the direction vi is
corrupted, the direction Jvi is also corrupted. Therefore,
the set of all corrupted directions is given by V + JV .
In this paper, when a matrix P satisfies P 2 = P and
ImP = V , it is called a projection onto V . Then, we
choose a projection PV onto V . Since P⊤V JPV is also an
anti-symmetric matrix, the rank of P⊤V JPV is an even
number. The rank of the matrix P⊤V JPV equals the rank
of matrix (〈vi, Jvj〉)i,j . Hence, the rank of P⊤V JPV does
not depend on the choice of the projection PV onto V
while the choice of the projection PV onto V is not unique.
With these observations, we define the integers m∗ and
m∗∗ as m∗ = (rankP⊤V JPV )/2 and m∗∗ = dimV −m∗.
Since the rank of the submatrix (〈vi, Jvj〉)i,j=1,m0+1 is
2, the rank of (〈vi, Jvj〉)2m1i,j=1 is at least 2. As the rank of
(〈vi, Jvj〉)2m1i,j=1 equals the rank of P⊤V JPV , the inequality
m∗ ≥ 1 (6)
holds. Thus, the inequality dimV ≥ rankP⊤V JPV implies
m∗∗ ≥ m∗. (7)
So, since 2m1 ≥ m∗∗ +m∗, we have
m∗∗ ≤ 2m1 − 1. (8)
The quantum capacity C is characterized as follows.
Lemma 2. The capacity C is lower bounded as C ≥
(m0−m∗∗) log q in the adaptive case, i.e., the case when
Eve has a memory to perform her attack.
It is a key point for the construction of a code achiev-
ing the rate (m0 −m∗∗) log q to avoid the space V + JV
from the encoded space. As shown in Appendix D,
we can choose 2m0 independent vectors w1, . . . , wm0
and w′1, . . . , w
′
m0 satisfying the following conditions. (i)〈w′i, Jwj〉 = δi,j and 〈wi, Jwj〉 = 〈w′i, Jw′j〉 = 0 for
i, j = 1, . . . ,m0. (ii) The space V + JV is spanned by
wm0−m∗∗ , . . . , wm0 and w
′
m0−m∗∗ , . . . , w
′
m0 . The condi-
tion (i) enables us to choose a symplectic matrix g∗ such
that g∗ei = wi and g∗em0+i = w
′
i for i = 1, . . . ,m0 be-
cause the vectors wi and w
′
i with i = 1, . . . ,m0 have the
same symplectic structure as the vectors e1, . . . , e2m0 .
Then, we define the encoding unitary Ue := U(g∗) and
the decoding unitary Ud := U(g∗)−1U−10 · · ·U−1m1 . The
message space is set to H⊗m0−m∗∗ . The encoder is given
as follows. We fix an arbitrary density ρ0 on H⊗m∗∗ .
For any input density ρi on H⊗m0−m∗∗ , the encoder is
given as ρi 7→ Ue(ρi ⊗ ρ0)U−1e . The decoder is given as
ρ 7→ Trm∗∗(UdρU−1d ), where Trm∗∗ is the partial trace
with respect to the system H⊗m∗∗ .
To analyze this code, we remind the following facts.
First, the set of all corrupted directions is given by V +
JV . Second, the information on the computational basis
and the information on the Fourier basis are decoded
perfectly, if and only if the transmitted quantum state
is decoded perfectly [25], [20, Section 8.15]. It is clear
from the first fact and the construction of Ue and Ud
that the information on the computation basis and the
information on the Fourier basis is decoded perfectly even
when Eve makes an adaptive corruption. Therefore, even
for any adaptive corruption, the pair of the above encoder
and the above decoder can decode the original state ρi
on H⊗m0−m∗ . This discussion shows Lemma 2. Our
code construction depends only on g0, . . . , gm1 . That is,
it is independent of the remaining unitaries U˜1, . . . , U˜m1
of Eve’s corruption. The tightness of the evaluation in
Lemma 2 is guaranteed as follows.
Lemma 3. When Eve changes the state on the corrupted
edge to the completely mixed state, the capacity C equals
(m0 −m∗∗) log q.
Lemma 3 is shown in Appendix C. In this way, the
capacity is characterized by rankP⊤V JPV and dimV . The
following lemma clarifies the possible range of these two
numbers.
Lemma 4. The following conditions are equivalent for
two integers l∗ and l∗∗.
(1): 2m1 − 1 ≥ l∗∗ ≥ l∗ ≥ 1 and m0 ≥ l∗∗.
(2): There exists a sequence of Clifford unitaries
U(g0), . . . , U(gm1) such that 2l∗ = rankP
⊤
V JPV
and l∗ + l∗∗ = dimV.
The relation (2)⇒(1) is shown as follows. The in-
equality l∗∗ ≥ l∗ follows from (7), and the inequality
l∗ ≥ 1 follows from (6). Since rankP⊤V JPV = 2l∗, there
exist l∗∗ independent vectors x1, . . . , xl∗∗ ∈ V such that
〈xj , Jxi〉 = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . l∗∗. Since the number of
such vectors is upper bounded by m0, we have m0 ≥ l∗∗.
The relation 2m1 − 1 ≥ l∗∗ follows from (8). The oppo-
site direction (1)⇒(2) will be shown later by using after
Lemma 5. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 imply that the worst
quantum capacity is (m0 − 2m1 + 1) log q, which shows
Theorem 2.
V. BASIS-LINEAR NETWORK MODEL
To construct a concrete network model to satisfy Con-
dition (2) given in Lemma 4, we consider a special class of
5Clifford networks, called basis-linear networks. In basis-
linear networks, we assume that each Clifford unitary Ui
is characterized as the basis exchange caused by an in-
vertible matrix g¯i on F
m0
q , which is similar to the case
of CSS (Calderbank-Shor-Steane) code [26, 27]. That is,
the Clifford unitary Ui is given as the unitary U¯(g¯i) de-
fined by U¯(g¯)|x〉 = |g¯x〉. Its action on the Fourier basis
{|y〉F }y∈Fm0q is characterized as U¯(g¯)|y〉F = |[g¯]Fy〉F ,
where [g¯]F is defined as the transpose (g¯
−1)⊤ of the in-
verse matrix g¯−1 [15, Appendix A]. Hence, we have
U¯(g¯) = U
((
g¯ 0
0 [g¯]F
))
. (9)
Let e¯i be the vector in F
m0
q that has only one nonzero
element 1 in the i-th entry. By using the vector e¯1 =
(1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fm0q , the vectors v1, . . . , v2m1 are writ-
ten as vi = (v¯i,0) and vm1+i = (0, v¯
′
i) with v¯i :=
g¯−10 · · · g¯−1i−1e¯1 and v¯′i := g¯⊤0 · · · g¯⊤i−1e¯1 for i = 1, . . . ,m1.
We define the matrices V¯ and V¯ ′ as (v¯1, . . . , v¯m1) and
(v¯′1, . . . , v¯
′
m1). Then, we have
m∗=rank(V¯ ′)⊤V¯ , m∗∗=rank V¯ + rank V¯ ′−m∗. (10)
Lemma 5. The following conditions are equivalent for
three integers l1, l2, and l3.
(1): m1 ≥ l1 ≥ l3 ≥ 1, m1 ≥ l2 ≥ l3 ≥ 1, and m0 ≥
l1 + l2 − l3.
(2): There exists a sequence of invertible matrices
g¯0, . . . , g¯m1 over finite field Fq such that rank V¯ =
l1, rank V¯
′ = l2, and rank(V¯ ′)⊤V¯ = l3.
Lemma 5 is shown in Appendix E with the concrete
construction of a basis-linear network to satisfy Condi-
tion (2) in Lemma 5.
When Condition (1) of Lemma 4 holds, Condition (1)
of Lemma 5 holds with the condition l∗ = l3 and l∗∗ =
l1 + l2 − l3. Since Condition (2) in Lemma 5 implies
Condition (2) of Lemma 4 with this condition, we obtain
the direction (1)⇒(2) in Lemma 4, which completes the
proof of Theorem 2.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have shown that the quantum capacity is not
smaller than (m0−2m1+1) log d when the sender hasm0
outgoing channels, the receiver has m0 incoming chan-
nels, each intermediate node applies invertible unitary,
only m1 channels are corrupted in our quantum network
model, and other non-corrupted channels are noiseless.
Our result holds with the following two cases. In the first
case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are arbitrary
and the corruptions on the m1 channels are individual.
In the second case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes
are restricted to Clifford operations and the corruptions
on the m1 channels are adaptive, i.e., the attacker is al-
lowed to have a quantum memory. Further, our code in
the second case realizes the noiseless communication even
with the single-shot setting, and depends only on the
node operations, the network topology, and the places of
the m1 corrupted channels. That is, it is independent of
Eve’s operation on the m1 corrupted channels. This code
utilizes the following structure of this model. The error
in the first corrupted channel can be concentrated to one
quantum system. However, the errors of the computation
basis and the Fourier basis in another corrupted channel
split to two quantum systems in general. Hence, 2m1−1
quantum systems are corrupted in the worst case. As
explained in Appendix, the first case has been shown by
the analysis of the coherent information, and symplec-
tic structure including symplectic diagonalization on the
discrete system plays a key role in the second case. It is
an interesting remaining problem to derive the quantum
capacity when the operations on intermediate nodes are
arbitrary unitaries and the corruptions on the m1 chan-
nels are adaptive.
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APPENDIX
The appendix is organized as follows. Appendix A
discusses the classical case. Appendix B proves Lemma
1. Appendix C proves Lemma 3. Appendix D gives
the choice of vectors w1, . . . , wm0 and w
′
1, . . . , w
′
m0 that
are used in code to achieve the rate C ≥ (m0 −
m∗∗) log q. Since it employs symplectic diagonalization,
Appendix D2 summarizes a fundamental knowledge of
symplectic diagonalization. Appendix E proves Lemma
5.
Appendix A: Classical network model
We consider a classical network model as follows. Ev-
ery channel transmits a system whose number of elements
is d by one use of the network. The sender has m0 outgo-
ing channels. Node operations are not necessarily linear
but are invertible. m1 channels are corrupted. Hence, we
can assume that m1 corruptions are done sequentially.
Let X ′i−1 and Xi be the whole information before and
after the i-th corruption, respectively. Then, X ′i is writ-
ten as fi(Xi) by using an invertible function fi. Here, we
denote the input and output information of this network
by X0 and X
′
m1 , respectively. Since the channel capac-
ity of classical communication is given by the maximum
6mutual information between the input information and
the output information, it is sufficient to show that
I(X0;X
′
m1) = I(X0;Xm1) ≥ (m0 −m1) log d (A1)
with a certain distribution PX0 of X0.
Now, we set the distribution PX0 of X0 to be the uni-
form distribution, which implies that
H(X0) = m0 log d. (A2)
From the network structure, we find the relation
H(Xi|Xi+1) ≤ log d. The chain rule of conditional en-
tropy implies that
H(X0|Xm1) ≤ H(X0 . . . Xm1−1|Xm1)
=
m1−1∑
l=0
H(Xl|Xl+1Xl+2 . . . Xm1)
≤
m1−1∑
l=0
H(Xl|Xl+1) ≤ m1 log d. (A3)
The combination of (A2) and (A3) yields (A1).
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
It is sufficient to show the case when U0 is the identity
matrix. Let ρmix,m0−1 be the completely mixed state on
H⊗m0−1. We set the initial state to be |0〉〈0|⊗ρmix,m0−1.
Consider the time after the unitary Ui−1 is applied but
Γi is not applied yet. At this time, we denote the system
to be attacked and the remaining system by Ai and Bi,
respectively. After the application of Γi, we denote the
system to be attacked and the remaining system by A′i
and B′i, respectively. We consider Steinspring represen-
tation U˜i of Γi, in which the output of the environment
is Ei. Fig. 4 summarizes the relation among the systems
A′i−1, B
′
i−1, Ai, Bi, A
′
i, B
′
i, and Ei.
1iU −⋮
1 'iA −
1 'iB −
iA
iB

iU
'iA
'iB
iE
FIG. 4: Relation among systems A′i−1, B
′
i−1, Ai, Bi,
A′i, B
′
i, and Ei. After the application of the unitary
Ui−1, the operation U˜i is applied.
Since the state on A′1E1 is pure, we have H(A
′
1) =
H(E1). Hence, we have
H(A′1B
′
1)−H(E1) = H(A′1) +H(B′1)−H(E1)
=H(B′1) = (m0 − 1) log d. (B1)
As shown later, for i = 2, . . . ,m1, we have
H(A′iB
′
i)−H(Ei) ≥ H(A′i−1B′i−1)− 2 log d. (B2)
Combining (B1) and (B2), we have
Ic(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρmix,m0−1,Λ(U0,Γ1, U1, . . . ,Γm1 , Um1))
=H(A′m1B
′
m1)−H(E1, . . . , Em1)
≥(m0 − 2m1 + 1) log d. (B3)
Now, we show (B2). Consider the purification of
ρA′
i
Ei by using the reference system R. Then, H(R) =
H(A′iEi) = H(Ai). Since H(Ai) + H(A
′
i) − H(Ei) =
H(R) +H(A′i)−H(RA′i) = I(R;A′i) ≥ 0, we have
H(Ei) ≤ H(Ai) +H(A′i). (B4)
Thus,
H(A′iB
′
i)−H(Ei)
(a)
≥ H(A′iB′i)−H(Ai)−H(A′i)
=H(B′i) +H(A
′
i)−H(Ai)−H(A′i)− I(A′i;B′i)
=H(A′iB
′
iEi)−H(A′iEi) + I(A′iEi;B′i)
+H(A′i)−H(Ai)−H(A′i)− I(A′i;B′i)
(b)
=H(AiBi)−H(Ai) + I(Ei;B′i|A′i)−H(Ai)
(c)
≥H(AiBi)− 2H(Ai) = H(A′i−1B′i−1)− 2H(Ai)
≥H(A′i−1B′i−1)− 2 log d. (B5)
Here, (a) follows from (B4), (b) follows from
H(A′iB
′
iEi) = H(AiBi) and H(A
′
iEi) = H(Ai), and (c)
follows from I(Ei;B
′
i|A′i) ≥ 0.

Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 3
To show Lemma 3, we prepare the following lemma,
which will be shown in the end of this Appendix.
Lemma 6. When a channel ΛA is entanglement-
breaking, a channel ΛB satisfies the condition
max
ρ
Ic(ρ,ΛA ⊗ ΛB) = max
τ
Ic(τ,ΛB). (C1)
For the preparation of Lemma 3, we define the notation
for the generalized Pauli channel as follows. Given a
distribution P on F2lq , we define the channel ΛP as
ΛP (ρ) :=
∑
(s,t)∈F2lq
P (s, t)W(s, t)ρW(s, t)−1. (C2)
Then, we denote the uniform distribution over F2mq and
the uniform distribution over the subset {(s, 0)}s∈Fmq by
Pmix,m and PmixZ,m, respectively. Hence, the channels
on the attacked edges are the Pauli channel ΛPmix,1 .
We assume that the sender applies the encoding uni-
tary Ue before transmission and the receiver applies the
7decoding unitary Ud after the reception. Considering
the output behaviors on the computation basis and on
the Fourier basis, we find that the channel from the
sender to the receiver is given as Idm0−m∗∗ ⊗ ΛPmix,m∗ ⊗
ΛPmixZ,m∗∗−m∗ . Since PmixZ,m is the pinching channel
with respect to the measurement on the Fourier basis,
we find that the channel ΛPmix,m∗ ⊗ ΛPmixZ,m∗∗−m∗ is
entanglement-breaking.
Since the channel ΛPmix,m∗ ⊗ ΛPmixZ,m∗∗−m∗ is
entanglement-breaking, Lemma 6 guarantees that
max
ρ
Ic(ρ, (Idm0−m∗∗ ⊗ ΛPmix,m∗ ⊗ ΛPmixZ,m∗∗−m∗ )⊗n)
=max
ρ′
Ic(ρ
′, Id⊗nm0−m∗∗) = n(m0 −m∗∗) log q, (C3)
where Ic(ρ,Λ) is the coherent information.
Since the maximum transmission rate is upper
bounded by the maximum coherent information, we ob-
tain the converse part.

Proof of Lemma 6: Let A and B (A′ and B′) be the
input (output) systems of ΛA and ΛB, respectively. We
choose a state ρAB on AB. Let C be the reference system
of the state ρAB so that ρABC is the purification of ρAB.
Let ρ′ be the output system on the whole system of A′,
B′ and C.
Since ΛA is entanglement-breaking, it is written
as ΛA(σ) =
∑
a ρA′=a TrMaσ, where {Ma} is a
POVM and rankMa = 1. Hence, ΛA(ρABC) is writ-
ten as
∑
a PA′=aρBC|A′=a ⊗ ρA′=a, where PA′=a :=
TrMaρA and ρBC|A′=a := TrAMaρABC/PA′=a. Hence,
rank ρBC|A′=a = 1.
Then, we denote ΛB(ρBC|A′=a) by ρ′B′C|A′=a.
The coherent information Ic(ρAB,ΛA ⊗ ΛB) equals
D(ρ′A′B′C‖ρ′A′B′ ⊗ IC), which is evaluated as
D(ρ′A′B′C‖ρ′A′B′ ⊗ IC)
=D
(∑
a
PA′=aρ
′
B′C|A′=a ⊗ ρA′=a
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a
PA′=aρ
′
B′|A′=a ⊗ ρA′=a ⊗ IC
)
≤D
(∑
a
PA′=aρ
′
B′C|A′=a ⊗ |a〉〈a|
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a
PA′=aρ
′
B′|A′=a ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ IC
)
=
∑
a
PA′=aD(ρ
′
B′C|A′=a‖ρ′B′|A′=a ⊗ IC). (C4)
The inequality follows from the information processing
inequality for the map |a〉〈a| 7→ ρA′=a.
Since rank ρBC|A′=a = 1, ρBC|A′=a is a purification of
ρB|A′=a. D(ρ′B′C|A′=a‖ρ′B′|A′=a⊗IC) equals the coherent
information Ic(ρB|A′=a,ΛB). Hence, we have
Ic(ρAB,ΛA ⊗ ΛB)
≤
∑
a
PA′=aIc(ρB|A′=a,ΛB), (C5)
which implies that
max
ρ
Ic(ρ,ΛA ⊗ ΛB) ≤ max
τ
Ic(τ,ΛB). (C6)
Next, we show the converse inequality
max
ρ
Ic(ρ,ΛA ⊗ ΛB) ≥ max
τ
Ic(τ,ΛB). (C7)
For any state τ on the system B, define ρAB = ρA ⊗ τ
where ρA is a pure state. Then, we have
Ic(ρAB,ΛA ⊗ ΛB) = Ic(τ,ΛB). (C8)
Therefore, we obtain (C7). 
Appendix D: Choice of vectors w1, . . . , wm0 and
w′1, . . . , w
′
m0
1. Construction except for w′
m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
, . . . , w′
m0
Now, we choose we can choose 2m0 independent vec-
tors w1, . . . , wm0 and w
′
1, . . . , w
′
m0 satisfying the follow-
ing conditions. (i) 〈w′i, Jwj〉 = δi,j and 〈wi, Jwj〉 =
〈w′i, Jw′j〉 = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . ,m0. (ii) The space V + JV
is spanned by wm0−m∗∗ , . . . , wm0 and w
′
m0−m∗∗ , . . . , w
′
m0 .
Define V2 := KerP⊤V JPV ∩V . We choose another sub-
space V1 of V such that V1⊕V2 = V . Since P⊤V JPV is non-
degenerate on V1, we can choose m∗ independent vectors
wm0−m∗∗+1, . . . , wm0−m∗∗+m∗ ∈ V1 ⊂ F2m0q and other
m∗ independent vectors w′m0−m∗∗+1, . . . , w
′
m0−m∗∗+m∗ ∈
V1 ⊂ F2m0q such that 〈w′i, Jwj〉 = δi,j , 〈wi, Jwj〉 =
〈w′i, Jw′j〉 = 0 for i, j = m0−m∗∗+1, . . . ,m0−m∗∗+m∗.
Let wm0−m∗∗+m∗+1, ..., wm0 be a basis of V2. We define
V3 := KerP⊤V JPV . We have the direct sum V1 ⊕ V3 =
F
2m0
q . Based on them, as shown in Subsection D3, we can
choose independent vectors w′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1, . . . , w
′
m0 ∈
V3 ⊂ F2m0q to satisfy the conditions 〈w′i, Jwj〉 = δi,j and
〈w′i, Jw′j〉 = 0 for i, j = m0 −m∗∗ +m∗ + 1, . . . ,m0.
The subspace V4 is defined as the space spanned by
wm0−m∗∗+1, . . . , wm0 and w
′
m0−m∗∗+1, . . . , w
′
m0 . Choos-
ing a projection PV4 onto V4, we define the subspace
V5 := KerP⊤V4J . Since the dimension of the image
of P⊤V4J is 2m∗∗, that of V5 is 2(m0 − m∗∗). Also,
there is no cross term in J between V4 and V5 be-
cause 〈v, Jv′〉 = 〈PV4v, Jv′〉 = 〈v, P⊤V4Jv′〉 = 0 for v ∈
V4, v′ ∈ V5. Thus, the rank of P⊤V5JPV5 is 2(m0 −m∗∗),
where PV5 is a projection to V5. Hence, we choose
2(m0 −m∗∗) independent vectors w1, . . . , wm0−m∗∗ ∈ V5
and w′1, . . . , w
′
m0−m∗∗ ∈ V5 such that 〈w′i, Jwj〉 = δi,j
and 〈wi, Jwj〉 = 〈w′i, Jw′j〉 = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . ,m0−m∗∗.
8Since there is no cross term in J between V4 and V5,
the chosen vector w1, . . . , wm0 ∈ F2m0q and w′1, . . . , w′m0 ∈
F
2m0
q satisfy the conditions 〈w′i, Jwj〉 = δi,j and
〈wi, Jwj〉 = 〈w′i, Jw′j〉 = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . ,m0. There-
fore, we can choose a symplectic matrix g∗ such that
g∗ei = wi and g∗em0+i = w
′
i for i = 1, . . . ,m0 because
the vectors wi and w
′
i with i = 1, . . . ,m0 have the same
symplectic structure as the vectors e1, . . . , e2m0 .
2. Symplectic diagonalization
For the choice of w′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1, . . . , w
′
m0 , we prepare
fundamental knowledge for symplectic diagonalization in
the finite dimensional system. Assume that V is a finite-
dimensional vector space over a finite field Fq. We con-
sider a bilinear form Q from V × V to Fq. Given an ele-
ment v ∈ V , Q(v, ·) can be regarded as an element of the
dual space V∗ of V . In this sense, Q can be regarded as a
linear map from V to V∗. A bilinear form Q from V×V to
Fq is called anti-symmetric when Q(v1, v2) = −Q(v2, v1)
and Q(v1, v1) = 0 for v1, v2 ∈ V .
Lemma 7. Assume that an anti-symmetric bilinear form
Q is surjective, i.e., KerQ is {0}. Then, the dimen-
sion of V is an even number 2k. There exists a basis
w1, . . . , wk, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
k ∈ V such that Q(w′i, wj) = δi,j
and Q(wi, wj) = Q(w
′
i, w
′
j) = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , k.
Proof of Lemma 7: Such a basis can be chosen induc-
tively. We choose a non-zero vector w1 ∈ V . Since Q is
surjective, we can choose another non-zero vector w′1 ∈ V
such that Q(w′1, w1) = 1.
Due to the assumption of induction, we have vectors
w1, . . . , wl, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l ∈ V such that Q(w′i, wj) = δi,j and
Q(wi, wj) = Q(w
′
i, w
′
j) = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , l. Then,
we define the subspace Vl := {v | Q(w1, v) = · · · =
Q(wl, v) = Q(w
′
1, v) = · · · = Q(w′l, v) = 0}. Also, we de-
fine the subspace V ′l spanned by w1, . . . , wl, w′1, . . . , w′l ∈
V . Since Vl ∩ V ′l = {0}, we have the direct sum V =
Vl ⊕ V ′l . We choose a non-zero vector wl+1 ∈ Vl. Since
Q is surjective, we can choose another non-zero vector
vl+1 ∈ V such that Q(vl+1, wl+1) = 1. Also, we have
Q(wi, wl+1) = Q(w
′
i, wl+1) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , l. Based
on the direct sum V = Vl ⊕ V ′l , we have the decomposi-
tion vl+1 = v
′
l+1 + w
′
l+1 with v
′
l+1 ∈ V ′l and w′l+1 ∈ Vl.
Since w′l+1 ∈ Vl, we have Q(wi, w′l+1) = Q(w′i, w′l+1) = 0
for i = 1, . . . , l. Since Q(v′l+1, wl+1) = 0, we have
Q(w′l+1, wl+1) = Q(vl+1, wl+1) = 1. Therefore, we ob-
tain a desired basis. 
3. Choice of w′
m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
, . . . , w′
m0
Using symplectic diagonalization, we show that we can
choose independent vectors w′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1, . . . , w
′
m0 ∈
V3 ⊂ F2m0q , inductively. First, we choose um0−m∗∗+m∗+1
to satisfy the condition 〈um0−m∗∗+m∗+1, Jwj〉 =
δm0−m∗∗+m∗+1,j for j = m0 − m∗∗ + m∗ + 1, . . . ,m0.
Based on the direct sum V1 ⊕ V3 = F2m0q , we decom-
pose um0−m∗∗+m∗+1 = u
′
m0−m∗∗+m∗+1+w
′
m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
such that u′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1 ∈ V1, w′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1 ∈V3. Since 〈u′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1, Jwj〉 = 0, we have〈w′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1, Jwj〉 = δm0−m∗∗+m∗+1,j for j = m0 −
m∗∗ +m∗ + 1, . . . ,m0.
Next, from vectors w′m0−m∗∗+m∗+1, . . . , w
′
l ∈ V3 ⊂
F
2m0
q , we choose ul+1 to satisfy the conditions
〈ul+1, Jwj〉 = δi,j , 〈ul+1, Jw′i〉 = 0 (D1)
for j = m0 − m∗∗ + m∗ + 1, . . . ,m0 and i = m0 −
m∗∗ + m∗ + 1, . . . , l. Based on the direct sum V1 ⊕
V3 = F2m0q , we decompose ul+1 = u′l+1 + w¯′l+1 such
that u′l+1 ∈ V1, w¯′l+1 ∈ V3. Then, we define w′l+1 :=
w¯′l+1 +
∑l
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi. Hence, we have
ul+1 = u
′
l+1 − (
∑l
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi) + w′l+1.
Since u′l+1 −
∑l
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi ∈ V and
wj ∈ V2 = KerP⊤V JPV ∩ V for j = m0 − m∗∗ + m∗ +
1, . . . ,m0, we have the relation
〈u′l+1 −
l∑
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi, Jwj〉
=〈PV (u′l+1 −
l∑
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi), JPVwj〉
=〈u′l+1 −
l∑
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi, P⊤V JPVwj〉 = 0.
(D2)
For i′ = m0 −m∗∗ +m∗ + 1, . . . , l, we have
〈u′l+1 −
l∑
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉wi, Jw′i′ 〉
=〈u′l+1, Jw′i′〉 −
l∑
i=m0−m∗∗+m∗+1
〈u′l+1, Jw′i〉〈wi, Jw′i′ 〉
=〈u′l+1, Jw′i′〉 − 〈u′l+1, Jw′i′ 〉 = 0. (D3)
The combination of (D1), (D2), and (D3), implies the
relations 〈w′l+1, Jwj〉 = δl+1,j and 〈w′l+1, Jw′i′ 〉 = 0.
Notice that 〈w′l+1, Jw′l+1〉 = 0 holds since J is anti-
symmetric.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 5
Now, we show (2)⇒(1). Since the relations m1 ≥
l1 ≥ l3, m1 ≥ l2 ≥ l3 are trivial, it is sufficient to show
m0 ≥ l1 + l2− l3 and l3 ≥ 1. Since the matrix (V¯ ′)⊤V¯ is
not zero, we have l3 ≥ 1. The relation m0 ≥ l1 + l2 − l3
follows from (8) and (10). Thus, we obtain the relation
(2)⇒(1).
Now, we show (1)⇒(2). We assume that l1 ≥ l2. Oth-
erwise, we can exchange the computation basis and the
9Fourier basis. We choose g¯m1 to be the identity matrix.
For i = 1, . . . ,m1, we choose g¯i−1 to be Ai−1A−1i , where
the matrix Ai is defined as follows.
A0 is the identity matrix. For i = 1, . . . , l3, we define
Ai as the transposition between the 1-st entry and the
i-th entry. For i = l1 + 1, . . . ,m1, we define Ai as the
identity matrix.
For i = 1, . . . , l2 − l3, we define Al3+i in the following
way. For the 1-st, l3 + 2i − 1-th, and l3 + 2i-th entries,
it is defined as

 1 0 11 1 0
0 0 1

. For other indices j, j′, the
matrix component (Al3+i)j,j′ is defined as δj,j′ .
For i = 1, . . . , l1 − l2, we define Al2+i in the following
way. For the 1-st and 2l2−l3+i-th entries, it is defined as(
1 0
1 1
)
. For other indices j, j′, the matrix component
(Al2+i)j,j′ is defined as δj,j′ .
Then, for i = 1, . . . , l3, we have v¯i = e¯i. For i =
1, . . . , l2 − l3, we have v¯l3+i = e¯1 + e¯l3+2i−1. For i =
1, . . . , l1 − l2, we have v¯l2+i = e¯1 + e¯2l2−l3+i. For i =
l1 + 1, . . . ,m1, we have v¯i = e¯1.
The matrix [Al3+i]F is characterized for i = 1, . . . , l2−
l3 as follows. For the 1-st, l3 + 2i − 1-th, and l3 + 2i-th
entries, it is given as

 1 −1 00 1 0
−1 0 1

. For other indices
j, j′, ([Al3+i]F )j,j′ is given as δj,j′ .
The matrix [Al2+i]F is characterized for i = 1, . . . , l1−
l2 as follows. For the 1-st and 2l2 − l3 + i-th entries, it
is given as
(
1 −1
0 1
)
. For other indices j, j′, the matrix
component ([Al2+i]F )j,j′ is given as δj,j′ . Then, for i =
1, . . . , l3, we have v¯
′
i = e¯i. For i = 1, . . . , l2 − l3, we
have v¯′l3+i = e¯1 + e¯l3+2i. For i = 1, . . . , l1 − l2, we have
v¯′l2+i = e¯1. for i = l1 + 1, . . . ,m1, we have v¯
′
i = e¯1.
Therefore, we have rank V¯ = l1 and rank V¯
′ = l2.
Also, when j = 2, . . . , l3 or j
′ = 2, . . . , l3, we have
((V¯ ′)⊤V¯ )j,j = δj,j′ . When j = 1, l3 + 1, . . . ,m1 or
j′ = 1, l3 + 1, . . . ,m1, we have ((V¯ ′)⊤V¯ )j,j = 1. Hence,
rank(V¯ ′)⊤V¯ = l3. Thus, we obtain the relation (1)⇒(2).
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